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PROFESSOR MEHLMAN HAS done an extraordinary job re-
viewing the state of the art of medical technology assessment as
well as providing a critique of appropriate analytical methods.
Doctors Perry and Chu, the other commentators on Professor
Mehlman's article, have reviewed the growing number of organiza-
tions involved in medical technology assessment in this country. I
wish to make the point that data are needed so that these assess-
ments can be implemented.
At the heart of technology assessment in medical care is a con-
flict between what is good for the individual and what is good for
society. There is a social cost that results from our failure to evalu-
ate carefully. But careful evaluation requires a comparison between
those who receive a particular treatment with those who do not,
and this requires patient involvement.
One of many examples is prefrontal lobotomy, a surgical proce-
dure introduced in 1935 and presumed to benefit mental patients.
After tens of thousands of operations, this procedure lost favor in
the 1960's.1 In spite of the lack of evidence of its efficacy, Egas
Moniz was awarded the 1949 Nobel Prize in Medicine for pioneer-
ing the prefrontal lobotomy. In its heyday in the United States,
there were about 5,000 patients per year who had large parts of
their brains removed in accordance with this surgical treatment.
These patients paid the social price for our failure to rigorously
evaluate the efficacy of this technology.
There is another reason why medical technology assessment is
desirable. Because I pay for your health care through taxes, social
* Professor of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Keck Foundation Senior Research
Scholar, Professor of Medicine, Adjunct Professor of Organizational Behavior, Co-Director
Health Systems Management Center, Faculty Editor HEALTH MATRIX, Case Western Re-
serve University. B.A., Harvard (1961); M.H.A., University of Michigan (1963); M.B.A.
(1966), Ph.D. (1971) University of Chicago.
1. See E. VALENSTEIN, GREAT AND DESPERATE CURES 280, 284 (1986).
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security, and insurance premiums, I want you to have only effective
and appropriate medical care-no more and no less.
Evaluation of medical technology is difficult due to at least five
obstacles which must be overcome:
First, the best methods of evaluation are new. The earliest
known Randomized Clinical Trial (RCT) occurred in 193 1;2 RCTs
did not become widespread until the 1950's. The first such trial to
include a cost analysis was published in 1980. It was not until 1985
that the first trial to measure all benefits, including full costs and
patient satisfaction, was published.3 Old technologies, such as lo-
botomies, were not evaluated using these new methods.
Second, patients differ substantially from each other. The fact
that patient A with treatment X improved, while patient B without
treatment X did not, is not necessarily due to treatment X. This
reality makes evaluation much more difficult. The accurate com-
parison between patients with and without treatment X requires
that the patient populations be defined and uniform.
Third, there are the all too human biases of inventors, manufac-
turers, and users of medical technology. It is desirable that people
strive to find a cure for cancer. But, this effort creates the risk that
the inventor will become a salesman who, in his own enthusiasm,
will convince himself that he has a cure when he, in fact, does not.
This problem is greatly exacerbated when the advocate has already,
for other reasons, achieved a great reputation. Such was the case
with Dr. Wangensteen's advocacy of Gastric Freezing which was
eventually shown to be harmful after 1500 machines were sold.4
In addition, physicians, in their compassionate desire to help the
suffering patient before them, may prescribe a treatment that is de-
monstratively efficacious for another type of condition but which
has not been proven effective in treating the condition at hand. The
indiscriminate and inappropriate use of the drug cimetidine pro-
vides such an example. The Food and Drug Administration's "yes"
or "no" approval system is helpless against this large problem.
2. See Amberson, McMahon & Pinner, A Clinical Trial of Sanocrysin in Pulmonary
Tuberculosis, AM. REV. OF TUBERCULOSIS 401 (1931).
3. See Pineault, Contandriopoulos, Valois, Bastian & Lance, Randomized Clinical
Trial of One-Day Surgery. Patient Satisfaction, Clinical Outcomes and Costs, 23 MED. CARE
171 (1985).
4. See Miao, Gastric Freezing: An Example of the Evaluation of Medical Therapy by
Randomized Clinical Trials, cited in COSTS, RISKS AND BENEFITS OF SURGERY 198-211 (J.
Bunker, B. Barnes & F. Mosteller eds. 1977); Wangensteen, Peter, Nicoloff, Walder, Sosin &
Bernstein, Achieving "Physiological Gastrectomy" by Gastric Freezing: A Preliminary Report
on an Experimental and Clinical Study, 180 J. A.M.A. 439 (1962).
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Moreover, human memory is selective. The physician may remem-
ber the cures and forget the failures (or vice versa), thus providing a
biased view of efficacy. In short, physicians are human beings like
the rest of us.
Fourth, medical technology, disease, and the environment do
not stand still. The decline in tuberculosis from 1850 to 1950 al-
most certainly had more to do with changing housing conditions
than with treatment advances. Comparing coronary bypass surgery
with prior and more conservative medical treatment is misleading,
because both treatment methods have been improving with time.
These changes require concurrent evaluation of the alternatives, ne-
cessitating some patients to forego a treatment while a similar group
receives it.
Fifth, evaluation of medical care technologies establishes the de-
manding standard that a treatment effect exceed the placebo effect.
The placebo effect is created by the patient's belief that a particular
treatment will alleviate or cure the medical problem. The placebo
effect is very well documented. In 1955, Beecher estimated that a
third of the benefits of medical care resulted from the placebo ef-
fect.5 This makes medical care unique among economic markets in
that the consumer can maximize benefits of medical care by his or
her own ignorance.
To evaluate whether or not the treatment effect exceeds the pla-
cebo effect, drug trials may be conducted. These are referred to as
"double-blind" trials, because neither the patient nor the physician
knows whether any one patient receives the drug or the placebo.
This is not an exhaustive list of the problems inherent in tech-
nology assessment. In addition to these is the problem of long-term
effects. For example, diethylstilbesterol's harmful effects were not
found until the daughters of the patients became teenagers and de-
veloped vaginal cancer. Another problem is establishing causation.
Some diseases can be self limiting; yet the "cure" may be inappro-
priately attributed to treatment. Finally, the results of animal test-
ing are not completely transferable to humans; because a treatment
cures mice does not necessarily mean it will cure men.
Obtaining better information about the efficacy of medical care
requires the individual patient's willingness to participate in clinical
5. See Beecher, The Powerful Placebo, 159 J. A.M.A. 1602 (1955). For a more recent
listing of the studies undertaken which have verified this effect, see J. FRANK, PERSUASION
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trials. Thus, to some degree, an individual contribution is required
in order to achieve the social good of better knowledge about medi-
cal care efficacy. An attempt to show this tradeoff is presented in
Diagram 1.
Various methods of evaluation are placed on this graph accord-
ing to both their accuracy (vertical axis) and the individual commit-
ment to the social good required (horizontal axis). Readers may
not agree with the location of these methods and should feel free to
create their own diagram. For example, a Hindu believing in rein-
carnation may equate animals and human beings and, therefore,
place animal experiments to the far right of this diagram.
The worst form of evidence is the proverbial snake oil salesman.
The individual is free to purchase, and negligible evidence of effi-
cacy results. This has long been criticized by the courts. In 1630 in
Boston, the very first year of settlement, the court convicted
Nicholas Knopp for selling a cure for scurvy "of no worth or
value." 6
The best evidence would be obtained by compulsory, uniform,
double-blind, randomized, clinical trials. However, proper evalua-
tion of surgical procedures using this metbod would require sham
operations, where an incision is made but nothing done beyond
that.' It is generally accepted that such evaluations demand too
great an individual sacrifice in the name of social good. Yet, if any
one of this method's characteristics is deleted, accuracy and knowl-
edge are sacrificed. If one eliminates the compulsion, representa-
tiveness is sacrificed; if patients are informed and blinding is
eliminated, one loses control of the placebo effect; if randomization
is eliminated, one loses assurance that the experimental and control
groups are comparable; if one studies animals rather than humans,
one is not sure that the results will be similar in humans. Thus,
there are trade-offs between patient participation, informed consent,
choice, and the quality of evidence obtained.
The fiduciary relationship between physician and patient implies
that the physician can only recommend participation in a trial if he
or she believes that both treatments are equally beneficial. If
pushed hard, it would be exceedingly rare for a physician to be truly
indifferent. As the true indifference point is more sharply defined,
6. See J. YOUNG, TH' TOADSTOOl. MILLIONAIRES 16-17 (1961).
7. See. e.g., Cobb, Thomas, Dillard, Merendino & Bruce, An Evaluation of Internal-
Mammary-Artery Ligation by a Double-Blind Technique, 260 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1115
(1959).
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the number of physicians who could ethically recommend
randomization becomes exceedingly small.
Lawyers, physicians, and all of us who are absolutist in our be-
lief in the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient (and
absolutist in our belief of the individual good over social good)
should be willing to accept the consequences of these beliefs and, as
a result, be willing to receive unnecessary or harmful treatments for
ourselves and our families.
